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On 9 April, Vera Jourová, Vice President of the European Commission for values
and transparency with lead responsibility for rule of law, gave an interview to
Euronews on democracy in the pandemic.  A journalist asked whether she believes
that Hungary still qualifies as a democracy after the Enabling Act creating an
indefinite state of emergency was enacted by the Hungarian Parliament on 30
March.   Her answer was not reassuring:
This is a tricky question and I will not give you a direct answer. We will have
to wait and see how the increased emergency powers of the government
are applied. So far the Hungarian emergency law is comparable with other
laws in EU.
Jourová has been too ready to rely on statements by Hungarian officials, including
most prominently Hungarian Justice Minister Judit Varga, who keeps reassuring
Jourová and others that the Hungarian Parliament and the Constitutional Court can
supervise this emergency in an effective and constitutional way and that they can
call off the emergency whenever they wish.  Varga’s statements are dangerously
misleading.   Orbán’s emergency regime gives him unlimited legal power for as long
as he wants to use it, and all apparent checks on his power are illusory.   
This is no ordinary emergency
The Hungarian emergency law, pushed through the Hungarian Parliament on 30
March gives unlimited decree power to Viktor Orbán to “suspend the enforcement
of certain laws, depart from statutory regulations and implement additional
extraordinary measures by decree.”  (Section 2 of the law, see the full translation
here with the “reasoning” accompanying the law here.)   The scope of the law is
broad.   Orbán may use these emergency powers to “guarantee for Hungarian
citizens the safety of life and health, personal safety, the safety of assets and legal
certainty as well as the stability of the national economy” (Section 2 of the law).  
One wonders what reasonable government functions fall outside of this list.   
The government’s primary defense of the law is that adequate safeguards are in
place to control these extreme measures.   Justice Minister Judit Varga has been
out in front, giving interviews with the international press (see here and here and
here) reassuring everyone that the Parliament remains in session.  (Last week, for
example, the MPs even found time to ban gender change in the birth register after
a person has transitioned from one sex to another as an adult, a law that is now in
direct conflict with case law of the European Court of Human Rights.) Varga claims
that this hard-working Parliament may cancel Orbán’s decrees at any time, as the
constitution provides.  Moreover, she says, the Constitutional Court remains open
to check all decrees for their compatibility with the constitution.   As a result, these
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emergency powers can be challenged in a normal constitutional way.  Yes, Hungary
is using emergency powers to deal with the crisis but – Hungarian government
officials say – so are other countries in the EU.  Hungarian officials are quick to
accuse the EU, as they always do, of using “double standards” to single out Hungary
for special condemnation. 
The military is taking over
But Hungary’s emergency is not like that of any other country in Europe – or for
that matter any country anywhere.  Let us mention just a few of the powers that the
government has already claimed.   No other country has put military commanders
at the head of every hospital in the country.   Last week, on the orders of the
Hungarian health minister, these commanders cleared 36,000 hospital beds across
the country – mostly by ejecting terminally and chronically ill patients from these
hospitals and sending them home.   Nurses were frantically explaining to family
members how to change drips and bandages, how to administer shots, how to
look for dangerous turns in these patients’ conditions.  And now, of course, tens of
thousands of Hungarian families are isolated at home with sick and dying loved ones
who should have had hospital care.   Two hospital directors were fired for resisting
the government’s orders, which overrode doctors’ assessments of what was best for
their patients’ health.   Never mind that the real need for beds is about a tenth of the
government estimates.   
The government has also inserted the military into at least 150 “strategic” companies
to ensure their continued operation through the pandemic.  Among the companies
now under military direction are major players in the food business among many
others.   In addition, military are now much more visible on the streets.  Of course,
some countries, like the US, have deployed military units to help fight the pandemic.
  But those units are building field hospitals to handle the crush of patients; they are
not there for social control or economic guidance purposes, as they are in Hungary. 
Orbán has issued about 70 decrees so far with his newly found powers.  It is
impossible to summarize them all.  But to give you a sense of what Orbán is doing
with his unlimited power, we might point out Decree 46/2020 which obliterates data
protection in Hungary, since it permits the minister for innovation (but why him in a
viral emergency?) to access personal data of anyone in Hungary for the purposes of
fighting the pandemic.   Decree 47/2020 obliterates worker protections in the Labor
Code.  During the emergency, unlimited freedom of contract will return labor law
to the 19th century.  In the current situation of rapidly increasing unemployment,
employees now must accept even inhuman working conditions if they do not want to
lose their jobs.     
The Kartonpack case 
For the purposes of assessing the state of the rule of law, however, the most
alarming and distinctive part of the Hungarian approach to emergency powers is that
Orbán’s ability to order these extraordinarily exceptions to Hungarian (and EU) law
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are essentially unchecked.   Let’s take one concrete example to show how the new
system works and why both parliamentary and judicial controls on his power – relied
on by the Hungarian government to placate critics — fail.   
On Friday, 17 April, Orbán issued decree 128/2020, targeting by name Kartonpack,
a publicly traded company, for government intervention.  The government
commissioner in charge of this company (through the military structure Orbán has
installed in strategic companies) fired the whole Board of Directors within hours after
the decree was issued and replaced them with five new directors, at least three of
whom have held government positions with Orbán’s party.   The connection between
the emergency and this company – which manufactures cardboard boxes, including
some for the pharmaceutical industry – is tenuous to say the least.  Shareholders in
this company were not consulted – despite company law in Hungary that requires
shareholder participation in changes to the Board.  Instead, shareholders learned
about the changes only when a terse announcement a appeared on the webpage of
the Budapest Stock Exchange that announced the new directors but did not explain
why the changes had to be made.   This was not a nationalization of the company. 
The company retains its legal status as a publicly traded limited liability company.   It
is just under new, state-directed, leadership.   
Suppose that the Parliament or the ousted directors of this company or the
shareholders wanted to challenge this order.    Minister Varga has assured the EU
that such challenges are possible and that the Parliament and the courts retain their
oversight of Orbán’s decree powers.    But, as we will show, any attempted challenge
will fail.   
Parliament has effectively given up the power to
control Orbán 
 Under the Fundamental Law in Article 53.3, decrees issued in a state of emergency
lose their legal force after 15 days unless Parliament affirmatively approves
their continuation.   But in the Enabling Act, Parliament gave away that power.
  Section 3.1 of the Enabling Act explicitly provides that “Parliament authorizes
the Government to extend the effect of” the decrees that shall be issued in the
name of the emergency.  So even though the Parliament has gone on meeting and
could have, as the constitution envisions, extended each of these decrees as their
expiration date neared, the Parliament instead transferred its power to extend all
emergency decrees directly to Viktor Orbán.   
We can see the effects of this in the Kartonpack case.   Decree 128/2020 authorized
the replacement of the Board of Directors of Kartonpack but it did not do so on a
temporary basis.    The decree made a permanent change in the governing structure
of this company even though emergency decrees are supposed to lose their force
after 15 days unless Parliament approves.   Once Parliament transferred its power
to extend these decrees directly to the person who now has the unlimited power to
issue these decrees, however, it has no ability to interfere.  And decrees can order
actions with permanent effect.  
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So then, one might guess, the Parliament can object to this practice and withdraw
the power it gave to Orbán to prolong the emergency measures beyond 15 days
by changing the law.   The Enabling Act even says in Section 3.2 that Parliament
may withdraw this authorization for the government to extend the force of decrees.  
But the authorization for the government to extend the effect of emergency decrees
was in a part of the law (Section 3) that was deemed “cardinal” which, in Hungarian
constitutional law terms, means that it requires a two-thirds majority of the MPs
present to change it to withdraw the authorization.   Yes, Orbán currently controls
two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament which means he could ask them to change
this provision any time, or repeal the law altogether.  But why would he limit his
own power?   Moreover, as long as he holds his party together, they are unlikely to
object in any event.   The real problem occurs if and when the Parliament opposes
something he does. But this has never happened in the last ten years. Of course, he
could lose the two-thirds majority, although not in the wake of by-elections, because
they are suspended for the duration of the emergency, but if several Fidesz MPs die.
But with that, the opposition is not yet gaining the two-thirds, what would be needed
to amend or repeal the law.   Can they change the law or revoke the authorization
then?  
Orbán could do something outrageous enough – for example, taking control of a
private company as he did last Friday — to alienate members of his own party.   But
Orbán has built a safety net for himself into the emergency law so that he can issue
decrees modifying any law in Hungary indefinitely.   Two-thirds of MPs must now
object to indefinitely extending any future emergency decrees’ validity by changing
or repealing the law that gave Orbán those powers in the first place.   And that
assumes that the President of the Republic, a Fidesz loyalist who has been friends
with Orbán for decades, would not veto such a law.  (After all, the Enabling Act itself
was signed by the President within two hours of the Parliament’s passage of the
law, lest the Parliament have second thoughts.) Orbán therefore only needs to retain
the loyalty of one-third of the members of Parliament or the Hungarian President to
continue his unlimited decree power indefinitely.   Parliament has effectively given up
its power to control him.
No courts will be involved unless Orbán wants them
to be
To make matters worse, the legal presumption on which both the initial emergency
decree 40/2020 and the subsequent emergency statute (the Enabling Act) rest is
itself unconstitutional.  Decree 40/2020 declared a ’state of danger’, a special state
of emergency regulated by the Fundamental Law in Article 53 to provide exceptional
competences to combat natural disasters.  But the statute violates the Fundamental
Law that was enacted in 2011 with the exclusive support of the governing party. 
Article 53 of the Fundamental Law mentions only natural disasters and industrial
accidents, not pandemics. Legal provisions that regulate pandemics already exist
in an ordinary statute, Act 128 of 2011, which further regulates the management
of natural disasters.    In other words, there was no constitutional authorization
either for the decree or for the Enabling Act in the first place. The Enabling Act was
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not even needed either to cope with the crisis, since the existing ordinary laws,
for instance Act CLIV of 1997 on Health or Act CXXVIII of 2011 on Emergency
Management provide ample powers for dealing with a pandemic. For instance, the
current curfew requiring people to stay in their houses was ordered without using
emergency powers.    
But surely, then the courts can get involved – and courts might be more likely to
notice the unconstitutionality at the root of the whole system.   But courts will not get
involved now.   Another Orbán decree, Decree 74/2020, now regulates in detail the
operation of the ordinary courts under the state of emergency.  It was promulgated
the day after the Parliament passed its emergency law and it is clear from the scope
and scale of the decree that Orbán intends this decree to apply as long as the
emergency continues.   (And remember, only he gets to say when the emergency
ends because Parliament provided no time limits on the emergency itself in the
Enabling Act.)   
Under Decree 74/2020, the courts can suspend proceedings in any civil case at the
request of either party as long as it would be epidemiologically dangerous for people
to appear in person.   In criminal cases, the prosecutor can decide that a case
should be suspended or postponed during the emergency – and the postponement
can last until the emergency ends.   The decree allows judgments to be rendered
outside of a trial, and allows appeals to be determined without a hearing.  Moreover,
certain cases cannot be brought at all during the emergency, including private
prosecutions and cases “claiming compensation.”    In Hungary these days, the
trial-level courts are effectively closed – or rather selectively opened depending on
whether Orbán wants them to be.    If the fired members of the Kartonpack board
– or for that matter shareholders of the company who are concerned about the
takeover – bring a case to the Hungarian courts now to challenge the decree, they
are not guaranteed a hearing or any resolution of the case before the emergency
ends.   Decree 74/2020 provides many opportunities for cases to be delayed
indefinitely.  
No cases will reach the Constitutional Court
So then what about the Constitutional Court, which according to the Hungarian
Fundamental Law in Article 54.2, must remain open for the duration of an
emergency?   Yes, the Constitutional Court remains open but cases cannot get
to it as long as the lower-level courts are closed or severely restricted.   The
Constitutional Court can receive cases for abstract review if certain named officials
(for example, the president, the public prosecutor or the ombudsman) bring a case.  
But all of those officials are now close allies of the government and they are unlikely
to challenge anything that the current prime minister does.   There is a possibility that
one-quarter of MPs could bring a case, but that would require that the left-opposition
work with far-right Jobbik to agree on a challenge.  Even if a case could get to the
Constitutional Court, however, that court has long since been packed by regime
loyalists who are unlikely to disagree with this government.    
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In short, Judit Varga and other Hungarian government officials are stating true facts
– that the Hungarian Parliament is still in session and that the Constitutional Court
is still open.   But the implication of those statements – that those institutions can
control Orbán’s power – is simply false.  Yes, the Parliament is meeting, but Orbán
has claimed the power to issue decrees that escape parliamentary scrutiny and
renewal despite the fact that Article 53.3 of Orbán’s own constitution – requires
the Parliament to remain engaged in oversight during an emergency.  In order for
Parliament to change this state of affairs, it would have to amend or repeal the
emergency law, which would take a two-thirds vote of the Parliament to accomplish. 
  Even if Parliament could muster such a supermajority to challenge Orbán, his long-
time friend, the President of the Republic, can veto that law.   
So even if Orbán starts to lose his own supporters, he can carry on his indefinite
decree power as long as he holds the loyalty of the one-third of the Parliament and/
or the President of the Republic.   In addition, with normal judicial procedures altered
by decree, the judicial review of Orbán’s actions is likely to come too late for it to be
effective.
As a result, the oversight mechanisms that the Hungarian government has been
pointing to in order to reassure the world that Hungary still honors the rule of law are
illusory.   Orbán governs as a dictator and no plausible domestic mechanism can
now stop him. 
Many countries have declared states of emergency to deal with the pandemic.  But
Hungary’s state of emergency is like no other.  If Commissioner Jourová still believes
that the rule of law is intact in Hungary, she should stop relying on the Hungarian
government to tell her that all is well.   
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